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The Fashion Game: Network Extension of Matching Pennies
2013-06-06 | 编辑:

论文题目:The Fashion Game: Network Extension of Matching Pennies

论文作者:曹志刚,杨晓光

论文摘要:It is impossible, in general, to extend an asymmetric two-player game to networks, because there must be two populations, the row one and the column one, but we do not know how to define inner-population interactions. This is not the case for Matching Pennies, as we can interpret the row player as a conformist, who prefers to coordinate her opponent's action, while the column player can be interpreted as a rebel, who likes to anti-coordinate. Therefore we can naturally define the interaction between two conformists as the coordination game, and that between two rebels as the anti-coordination game. It turns out that the above network extension of Matching Pennies can be used to investigate the phenomenon of fashion, and thus it is named as the fashion game. The fashion game possesses an obvious mixed Nash equilibrium, yet we are especially interested in pure Nash equilibrium (PNE for short), whose existence cannot be guaranteed. In this paper, we focus on the PNE testing problem, namely given an instance of the fashion game, answer whether it possesses a PNE or not. Our first result is on the negative side: PNE testing, in general, is hard. For the PNE testing problem restricted to several special structures, i.e. lines, rings, complete graphs and trees, either a simple characterization or an efficient algorithm is provided.

所属实验室或研究中心:管理决策与信息系统重点实验室

全文链接:见附件
附件下载:
TCS(2nd).pdf
 
 
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